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IN THE SUPRE:t1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs

FRANCIS EUGENE KNILL,

No. 18122

Defendant-Appellant.

B.RIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Francis Eugene Knill was charged in criminal
proceedings by the State of Utah with one count of
Theft in violation of Section 76-6-604, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On October 15, 1981, Francis Eugene Knill was
found guilty of one count of theft by a jury in the
Seventh Judicial Court in and for Emery County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Judge Boyd Bunnell presiding.
Defendant was sentenced on that same date to
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison.
( 1)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks relief from the sentence
imposed as follows:
For an Order of this court reversing judgment
and sentence imposed by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant-Defendant and his son were arrested June
25, 1981 and booked in the Emery County Detention facility
He appeared before VarLynn Peacock, Justice of the Peace,
Emery County, State of Utah on June 26, 1981.

Defendant

was not represented by counsel but asked that counsel
be appointed.

Judge Peacock set bail at $15,000.00 and

·set preliminary hearing for July 22, 1981.
Defendant was first aware that cot.msel had been
appointed on July 7, 1981.

Charles Taylor, the then

Emery County Public Defender, was appointed to represent
both Appellant and his son.

Defendant appeared before

Judge Peacock on July 17. 1981 and waived preliminary
hearing upon assurance that if Appellant were to plead
guilty to a felony, his son would not be prosecuted.
On

July 28, 1981 Defen'lant retained private counsel,

appeared for arraiT)1ment in Di.strict Court of Emery County
and moved for remand to the Justice Court for preliminary
(2)
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hearing.

Said Motion was granted.

On August 18, 1981, no date for preliminary had been
set.

Defendant petitioned District Court of Emery County,

Civil No. 4010 for Writ of Habeas Corpus, hearing on
Petition was had on September 1, 1981, writ was issued
September 9, 1981 and hearing was set for September 14,
1981.

At the hearing, Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge

ruled without argument by the State, that a Writ of
Habeas Corpus was not the proper procedure for raising
the issue of lack of speedy trial and that a Motion to
Dismiss was the appropriate means by which to raise such
issue.
Preliminary hearing was had in the Eleventh Circuit
Court in and for Emery County on September 10, 1981.
Appellant was bound over to District Court on two counts.
1

Appellant was arraigned October 6, 1981, Defendant s Motion
to Dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was denied with no
argument by Prosecution and trial was set for October 15,
1981.
Appellant filed ExParte Motion to Produce and Affidavit
on October 12, 1981.
Affidavit.

The State filed no response nor

Motion was denied.

Appellant filed Motion to Suppress on October 12, 1981
( 3)
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with hearing set for 9:00 A.M. October 15, immediately
prior to trial.

The State did not file response nor did

they argue against said motion.

The Motion to Suppress

was denied.
Appellant was tried on October 15, 1981, by jury,
convicted of theft, in violation of Section 76-6-604
U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a second degree felony.

Appellant

was sentenced that day to serve one to fifteen years in
the Utah State Penitentiary.

POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM STOP OF AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT
PROB AB LE CAUSE .
Defendant was stopped by Sgt. Jewkes, Utah Highway
Patrol.

At Motion to Suppress Hearing, innnediately prior

to trial Sgt. Jewkes testified at page 5 line 8-9 that
the reason he "probably" stopped was a report on a license
plate.

At Trial page 50 lines 3-13 Sgt. Jewkes testified

that he had it in his mind he'd probably stop the car and
called in the

licen[~e

plate number "as a precaution."

At

the time he took the precaution, the only thing Defendant
had done was slow down when he saw a highway patrol car.
( 4)
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..... (2) a policeman's stopping
an automobile and detaining the
driver in order to check the
driver's license and the registration
of the automobile constitute an
unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
except in those situations in which
there is at least an articulable
and reasonable suspicion that a
motorist is unlicensed, or that
an automobile is not registered, or
that either the vehicle or an
occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, such
rule against random stops and
detentions, however, not precluding
a state from developing methods for
spot checks that involve less
intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of
discretion, such as, for example,
the questioning of all oncoming traffic
at roadblock-type stops.l at 661.
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is further set
forth in Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended as follows:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer
to stop and question suspect - Groundsa peace officer may stop any person in
a public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense
and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his action.
Mere suspicion is not sufficient to establish
probable cause for a stop 2 despite the good intentions
of an officer 3 .

1.

State of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99S.Ct. 1319,

2.

Mallory v. U.S., 354 US 449, lLEd 2d 1479, 77S.Ct. 1356,

59 LEd 2d 660 (1979).

frq r; 7'
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379 US 89, 13LEd 2d 142, 85 S.Ct.223,(1964).
(5)

Defendant was stopped on the mere suspicion of
a police officer in violation of his rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence resulting
from said stop was denied.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
IN THE EARLY STAGES OF HIS PROSECUTION CONTRIBUTING TO A
DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL .

. . . (T)he assistance of counsel
is among those constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial
that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error.
[Citations Omitted]4
Defendant, in the case at bar, was incarcerated
and was not represented by counsel when preliminary
hearing was set for a date twenty-six days later contrary
to the dictates of the Utah Code which requires a
preliminary hearing be had within ten (10) days if a
. incarcerate
.
d.5
person in

Counse 1 was appointed to represent both De.fendant
and his son who was similarly charged.

Upon advice of

counsel Defendant was encouraged to waive preliminary

4.
5.

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 55 LEd.2d 426, 98
S. Ct. 117 3 ( 19 7 8) .
U.C.A. 77-35-7
(6)
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hearing and plead guilty in exchange for the dismissal
of the charges against Defendant's son.

Said charges

were dismissed.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in the case of
Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P2d 437 (1971)
which involved dual representation by one attorney of
a husband and wife wherein husband pleaded guilty to a
felony as a part of a plea bargain and charges were
dismissed against the wife.

The Court held that the dual

representation did not constitute denial of adequate
representation.
However, the Court's attention is called to the
decision of Cheif Justice Traynor in the CalifoTI1ia case
of People v. Chacon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P2d 106 (1968)
wherein the Court said:
If counsel must represent
conflicting interests or is
ineffective because of the
burdens of representing more
than one defendant, the injured
defendant has been denied his
constitutional right to effective
counsel. [Citations Omitted].
Counsel representing co-defendants cannot· effectively
represent the Defendant whom he encourages to waive his
right to confront witnesses and to trial by jury in exchange
(7)
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for the release of a co-defendant.
Here the result of joint representation was a
delay in the proceedings which constituted a denial of
Defendants right to a speedy trial. 6

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Sixth Amendement of the United States Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Utah 7 guarantees
the right to a speedy trial.

Defendants trial in the

Court below was held more than three and one-half months
after his arrest.
Defendants first preliminary hearing was set 16
days beyond the limit allowed by the Utah Code. 8
date was waived as discussed at Point I I supra.

That
The matter

was remanded on July 28, 1981 for preliminary hearing and
the actual hearing was not had until September 10, 1981 -.two and one-half months after arrest and fortv-four (44)
days after remand.
Trial was set in District Court for October 15, 1981
more than the thirty day limitation set forth·in U.C.A.
77-1-8(6).

Defendant was prejudiced by the delay because the

6.
7.
8.

United States Constitution, Amendment Six.
Article I, Section 12.
U. C.A. 77-35-7
( 8)
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physical evidence of theft, the automobile, was released
to the alleged owner on July 6, 1981 9 and was unavailable
for inspection by defense counsel when conflict in
identification of said automobile arose.

Had there been

a timely preliminary and/or a timely appearance of
appointed counsel, the automobile would have been
available for inspection. The right to a speedy trial is
a fundamental right. 10 The purpose of that right is,
among other things, to limit the possibility that delay
will impair Defendants defense 11 as it did in this case.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RULING THAT
HABEAS CORPUS WAS

Pu~

INAPPROPRIATE PRETRIAL REMEDY AND

WAS UNAVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT.
"Ordinarily the inquiry in a Habeas corpus matter
is as to the legality of the detention. 1112
On August 18, 1981 Defendant petitioned the Court

below for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that
his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been denied.
Twenty-eight (28) days later the District Court Judge ruled
that Habeas Corpus was not the proper proceeding to raise
the issue.

His ruling was an abuse of discretion.

Transcript - page 44 line 14.
10. Klo!fer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.213,87S.Ct.988, 18LEd.

9.

1d

, (1967).

11. U.S. v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 15 LEd 2d 627, 86 S.Ct. 773,
(1966).
1'>
~-~terest of Hales, 538 P2d 1034 (1975).
~.1...-L-

-

•
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(9)

Rule 65B

'

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

( f) Habeas Corpus.
Appropriate
relief by habeas corpus proceedings
shall be granted whenever it appears
to the proper court that any person
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise
restrained of his liberty.
If the
person seeking relief is imprisoned
in the penitentiary and asserts that
in the proceedings which resulted in
his conviction there was a substantial
denial of his rights under the
Constitution of the United States or
under the Constitution of the state of
Utah, or both, then the person seeking
such relief shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 65B(i).
In all other cases,
proceedings under this subdivision shall
be conducted in accordance with the
following provisions:
Defendant challenged the legality and constitutionality
of his incarceration and was told that Habeas Corpus was
not the appropriate method of complaint.
Defendant's Motion to dismiss on the same grounds
was filed September 30, 1981, was heard October 6, 1981
and denied without argument by the Prosecution forty-nine
(49) days after Defendants original petition for relief
J

•

was filed.

-

-·

....

, ·.:, .

POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN.ITS DENIAL
OF DEFENDANTS PRETRIAL MOTION TO PRODUCE AND MOTION TO
DISMISS AT TRIAL.
Upon discovery that there existed conflicting

( 10)
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evidence identifying the alleged stolen vehicle, Defendant
on October 1981 moved for an Order for Plaintiff to
produce the vehicle for inspection.

Said motion was denied.

At the conclusion of the State's case Defendant
moved to dismiss because of conflicting testimony regarding
identification of the allegedly stolen vehicle.

Said
motion was denied without any argument by the State. 13
The Utah Court has ruled in the case of State v. Hall,
105 Utah 163, 145 P2d 494, (1944) that:
Under the authorities, it is clear
that the State must definitely identify
the goods fotmd in the defendant's
possession as the goods which were
charged to have been stolen before the
jury may draw an inference of guilt
based upon the proof of possession
by the defendant of such goods at
496. [Citations Omitted].
The Court's refusal to Order production and refusal
to dismiss for the states failure to definintely identify
the vehicle along with its refusal to give Defendant's
proposed jury instruction no. 3 constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
The Utah Court defined "discretion" in Carmen v. Slavens,
546 P2d 601 (1976) as follows:
It is true that where the
authority to perform a proposed
action rests within the discretion
of the court we must allow
considerable latitude in which
13.

Transcript pages 71-72
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( 11)

he may exercise his judgment.
But this does not mean that the
court has unrestrained power to
act in an arbitrary manner.
Fundamental to the concept of
the rule of law is the principle
that reason and justice shall
prevail over the arbitrary and
uncontrolled will of an.y one
person; and that this applies
to all men in every status: to
courts and judges, as well as to
autocrats or bureaucrats. The
meaning to the term "discretion"
itself imports that the action
should be taken within reason
and good conscience in the
interest of protecting the
rights of both parties and
serving the ends of justice at
603 [Citations Omitted].

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits, based on the
foregoing points and authorities that judgment entered
at trial be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

~N~

(12)
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